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This book reports the results of one of several projects pursued within the
research program Working and Earning under Different Rules, led by Richard
Freeman of Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.
1 The Working and Earning program comprised a series of comparative
studies of labor market institutions, income maintenance programs, and eco-
nomic performance in the United States and other major OECD nations. It
aimed to answer three large questions and to make the answers available to
participants in policy debates in the United States (Freeman 1989, 5):
How do the distinctive labor market institutions and income maintenance
schemes of advanced OECD countries work?
Which institutions offer fruitful guides to what the United States should
(should not) do to improve its competitive position and economic well-being?
What explains the divergence of labor market institutions across OECD
countries?
From the program's inception, works councils have been high on its list of
research concerns. There are two reasons for this.
First, traditional forms of worker representation—whether the centralized
bargaining and "political exchange" once characteristic of European countries
or the more decentralized systems of collective bargaining characteristic of
North America—are under pressure. This raises anew questions about how to
provide workers with institutionalized representation at the workplace. In the
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United States in particular, the continued decline of unionization—which now
claims a bare 12 percent of the private sector workforce—has opened a yawn-
ing "representation gap" (Weiler 1990) that does not appear likely to be closed
anytime soon by a simple revival of traditional unionism. Recognition of this
gap has kindled new interest in alternative ways of providing "voice" for work-
ers outside the traditional collective bargaining relationship. As works councils
have in many countries historically provided representation to workers outside
of formal collective bargaining, they provide a natural starting point to explore
such alternative modes of worker representation.
2
Second, councils appear capable of making an efficiency contribution to the
performance of advanced industrial democracies, improving both individual
firm productivity and the effectiveness of state regulation (economic or social)
of firms. It is virtually definitive of councils, for example, that they increase
and regularize consultation between management and workers. This may be
thought to have several positive effects. By reducing information asymmetries
between managers and workers, consultation can lead to more efficient labor
contracts. By lowering the costs of information to both parties, it can facilitate
adjustment to changed circumstances. By increasing trust between managers
and workers, it can increase their willingness to engage in cooperative ven-
tures, and with it increase the rewards that accrue to cooperation.
3 At a time
when new forms of work organization—arising from the demands of shifting
product markets and increased emphasis on "quality" production—place a
premium on an unimpeded flow of information within firms and on coopera-
tion among and between workers and managers, these potential effects have
enormous appeal. In the United States, where the pace of adoption of advanced
forms of work organization has been slow (Office of Technology Assessment
1990), that appeal is particularly pronounced.
The potential contribution of councils to effective regulation of firms is also
evident. It is now well past cliche to observe that, to enhance competitive eco-
nomic performance, government regulation of labor markets and working con-
ditions needs to be "micro" as well as "macro." However fine, the regulation
of fiscal aggregates and monetary policy is insufficient, for example, to assure
an adequately trained workforce, rapid technology diffusion, or dynamically
optimal levels of investment in research and development. To approximate
these ends, considerable coordination and cooperation within firms—as well
as among firms and between private firms and the state—is required. By pro-
2. To guard against misinterpretation in this highly charged area of current debate, we empha-
size that the exploration of alternatives is not tantamount to the endorsement of those alternatives,
or to rejection of that which they are alternative to.
3. Among others, see Freeman (1990), Freeman and Rogers (1993), Rogers and Streeck (1994),
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viding structured means of such intrafirm coordination, the thought goes,
councils might help support government "modernization" policies in these
areas.
What is true of economic regulation is true as well of fair labor standards,
health and safety standards, and other "social" regulation of firm behavior.
Directed to a large population of heterogeneous firms, such regulation in most
cases cannot be effectively enforced through a state inspectorate or an army of
"private attorneys general" bringing civil claims. Some on-the-ground moni-
toring and enforcement mechanism, rooted in the daily operation of firms, is
also desirable. Many think that works councils might be just such a mech-
anism.
It bears emphasis, if only for its centrality to the U.S. discussion, that the
availability of such local mechanisms might reasonably be expected to improve
not only regulatory enforcement but the regulation itself. In the United States,
the general absence of local monitoring and enforcement capacity has encour-
aged "command and control" regulatory programs. These, which are function-
ally adapted to the state inspectorate and private attorney general modes of
enforcement that do exist, are widely criticized as overly broad, inflexible,
and excessively process (as against performance) oriented. Councils are com-
monly involved in implementing social regulation, and then in ways that
appear to favor regulatory styles simultaneously more exacting on outcomes
and more flexible on means than is common in the United States. Here too,
then, better understanding of their operation may be instructive for U.S. policy
discussions.
It is not the purpose of this book to produce actual recommendations for
policy in the United States. All that research can do is clarify the issues at
stake. Framed by the basic questions posed by the Working and Earning under
Different Rules program, contributors to this volume aim to improve the avail-
able knowledge of: the incidence, activity, and daily operation of councils in
different settings; the contribution of councils to meeting representation and
efficiency concerns (both private firm efficiency and the efficiency of the state
or other collective regulatory effort); the precise institutional mechanisms that
account for these effects; the comparative institutional advantage of councils
(relative to other mechanisms) in producing those effects; and the conditions
antecedent (e.g., in industrial relations systems and public policy) to parts or
all of their production.
We begin this introduction by proposing an initial definition of works coun-
cils, broad enough to accommodate the diverse experiences of advanced
industrial countries, and by suggesting a working typology of councils.
We then proceed to explore the relations of works councils with, in turn,
unions, employers, and states, mapping the main subjects that will be
dealt with in the country studies and other subsequent chapters. Finally, we
explain the general approach of the research and the organization of this
volume.Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck
1.1 Basic Definition and Initial Typology
We define works councils as institutionalized bodies for representative com-
munication between a single employer ("management") and the employees
("workforce ") of a single plant or enterprise ("workplace "). This is a very
inclusive definition, but inclusiveness is needed to cover the great variation in
what have historically been considered "council" forms and functions, at dif-
ferent times, in different systems. The following elaborations may be offered:
1. Works councils represent all the workers at a given workplace, irrespec-
tive of their status as union members. Where in addition to councils there are
also unions claiming to represent workers, this raises the fundamental problem
of determining the relationship between councils and unions—a problem that
will occupy a central position in the studies in this book.
Where unions have strong "external," territorial organizations that engage in
multiemployer collective bargaining, council-union relations are part of the
vertical relationship between centralized and decentralized collective action of
workers and between central and local joint regulation with employers. To the
extent that (in addition) unions are, or try to be, organizationally present at the
workplace, the relationship is (also) a horizontal one between representation
of unionized workers through workplace union branches ("locals" and "sec-
tions") and representation of all workers through councils. In the typical Euro-
pean case, councils are in this way enmeshed in a complex triangular relation-
ship with what are often called the "external" and the "internal" unions.
At stake in this relationship are questions of control—of the external union
and centralized collective bargaining over works councils and internal unions
and over joint regulation at the workplace, and of works councils or internal
unions over workplace industrial relations with the employer. External unions,
where they lay claim to central control over workplace bargaining, view the
relationship between works councils and union branches above all in terms of
its contribution to such control. Typically, central and external control seems
to require a stable division of labor between external and internal industrial
relations, and especially neutralization of the latter on subjects over which the
former claim jurisdiction.
At the workplace, union-council relations differ in the extent to which coun-
cils and workplace unions are structurally independent from each other. At the
one extreme, as in Italy, worker and union representation may be merged in
one body. At the other extreme, as in Germany, councils may be clearly differ-
entiated structurally from unions and created and sustained not by union action
or governance but by a separate, legally based "works constitution."
To the extent that union and worker representation are structurally separated,
one can speak of two "channels" of representation: a "first channel" operating
through unions and collective bargaining—at the workplace, centrally, or
both—and a "second channel" working through councils and "industrial de-
mocracy," "collective participation," or "joint consultation" at the workplaceThe Study of Works Councils: Concepts and Problems
only. Structural separation of channels, however, does not preclude, and indeed
may require, coordination between them. Organizationally, for example, works
council election procedures typically favor union candidates, and especially
candidates of large, "representative" unions. This enables union workplace or-
ganizations to penetrate the council system at least to some extent and to use
it to promote union policies within the limits of whatever rules may govern
councils as institutions.
Functionally, mature council systems provide for an elaborate division of
labor between councils and unions, especially external unions. Just how func-
tions are divided is strongly related, again, to questions of control, particularly
over the wage bargain and the strike and more generally (of the external union)
over the workplace. In Spain and Italy, where councils may negotiate wages
and call strikes, external unions often find it difficult to make central wage
bargains stick locally and to prevent local bargainers from calling strikes in
pursuit of wage increases exceeding nationally negotiated rates. In Germany,
by comparison, the legally institutionalized separation of channels excludes
councils from wage bargaining and from calling strikes. With union workplace
organizations effectively subordinated to councils, national union leadership
has an effective monopoly on such functions. In return, works councils and the
union workplace organizations that are involved in them are compensated with
jurisdiction over a range of other, workplace-specific issues. In exercising this
jurisdiction, however, their mode of operation is not through collective bar-
gaining, but through legally based co-determination; and while they may exer-
cise pressure, they do so not by threatening or calling a strike, but by taking
the employer to mandatory arbitration or to the labor courts.
2. Works councils represent the workforce of a specific plant or enterprise,
not of an industrial sector or a territorial area. Their counterpart is a single
employer, not an employers' association. Industrywide councils, like wage
councils in the United Kingdom, are thus not works councils in the sense of
the definition used here.
3. Works councils are not "company unions."
4 Even as compared to a
single-site, employer-dominated union, there is a distinction between works
council representation of all workers in one workplace only and union repre-
sentation—of union members at the workplace or of the common interests of
workers across workplaces. Even "enterprise unions" in Japan, for example,
tend to be affiliated to union federations covering more than one employer,
weak as that affiliation may be.
5 By contrast, works councils are by definition
single-employer institutions. And even under closed-shop company unionism,
4. We use this term in its generic international sense of "workplace-specific union." For consid-
eration of the U.S. case, where what is traditionally meant by "company union" is approximated
by what we call "paternalistic" councils below, see Rogers (chap. 13 in this volume).
5. Japanese company unions often create union-management consultation committees, kept sep-
arate from the union itself, for joint deliberation of production issues. If there were a Japanese
equivalent to works councils, it would be these rather than the unions themselves.8 Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck
there is usually a possibility of interunion competition, with workers joining
an alternative union or management replacing the existing union with a "sec-
ond" union. By contrast, works councils are by definition not voluntary associ-
ations but established institutions with a representational monopoly. Once es-
tablished, workers cannot refuse to "join" them or to be represented by them.
There is no exit from a works council other than changing one's place of em-
ployment.
4. Being representative institutions, works councils also differ from man-
agement policies encouraging individual workers to express their views and
ideas, as well as from new forms of work organization introduced to increase
the "involvement" of workers in their work roles through decentralization and
expansion of competence and responsibility in production tasks ("group work,"
"quality circles," and the like). While works councils may make it easier for
managements to implement work reorganization, they themselves are institu-
tions outside the managerial line of authority (however decentralized) and dif-
ferentiated from the functional organization of production. And while works
councils make it easier for individual workers to speak up, as institutions of
collective representation they typically aggregate the views of workers and
transform them into a common voice of the workforce. If made at all, then, the
"firm efficiency" argument for works councils is not based on their occupa-
tional competence but on their organization of representative communication
between the employer and the workforce as a whole. Similarly, the "voice"
argument is not identical with the argument for a decentralized work organiza-
tion or for management being more accessible to individual workers.
5. Representative communication between employers and their workforces
may be of all possible kinds and may originate from either side. Communica-
tion may be initiated and, in the limiting case, controlled by the employer,
making the works council more like the "ear" than the "voice" of the work-
force. At the opposite end of the continuum, it may mainly serve to express the
collective interests of workers, with the employer obliged to listen. It may also
involve an exchange of views and a dialogue leading to negotiations and, ulti-
mately, agreement. Communication may or may not be on production issues,
or on how better to cooperate in the pursuit of production goals and good
competitive performance. It may be limited to information exchange, may
entail consultation, or may end in negotiated co-decision making, or co-
determination.^
Where council rights pertain only to information, managerial discretion is
left largely intact, except that managements cannot avoid giving information.
By contrast, consultation rights involve obligations for management to inform
6. Note here that whether a works council's relations with its employer are friendly or not is not
part of our definition. Even where strikes are formally ruled out as a means of applying pressure,
relations may well be highly antagonistic. And there is always the possibility, generally the case in
industrial relations, that the law is not fully observed in practice.9 The Study of Works Councils: Concepts and Problems
the works council before a decision is taken, to wait for a considered response
or counterproposal, and to take it into consideration when finally deciding.
While this still leaves the decision to management, it may delay it. Finally,
under co-determination, decisions can be taken by management only if they
are agreed to beforehand by the council; in this sense the council can veto
them, usually until the matter is resolved by an outside arbitration board.
6. Works councils may (the usual case) or may not have legal status. In the
limiting case, they may be set up unilaterally or voluntarily by the employer,
with the employer retaining the option of dissolving them if they do not per-
form to—paternalistic—expectation. Works councils may also be created or
regulated by industrial agreement between unions and employers' associations
at the sectoral or national level.
Typically, however, such agreements will in some way be encouraged or
supported by legislation. In fact, most council systems are more or less strongly
legally institutionalized, with legislation playing a facilitating role even in
countries like Sweden and Italy where councils are primarily union based. Le-
gal status usually affords works councils an institutional power base indepen-
dent from both union and employer.
7
7. Works council structures vary widely across and within countries. Repre-
sentation may be categorically encompassing, with all employees in a given
workplace being represented by one common body, or categorically differenti-
ated, with different councils representing different groups of employees (e.g.,
blue-collar vs. white-collar workers). Councils may be functionally compre-
hensive, in the sense that all concerns of the workforce are represented by
the same body, or functionally differentiated, with different councils serving
different functions (e.g., health and safety councils, training councils, and pro-
ductivity councils). Councils may or may not include management; in the lim-
iting case, the employer may preside over council meetings.
8 And systems vary
in the structure of the resource base supporting council operation—although
in general works councils are not financed out of union dues, do receive some
support from the employer, and are typically entitled to such support on a basis
other than the employer's free and changeable will.
8. Works councils are not the same as worker representation on company
boards of directors. This said, councils often coexist with such representation,
and in such cases are closely related to it. In the German case, for example,
"economic co-determination" through workforce and union representatives on
the supervisory boards of large firms became closely linked in the 1970s and
1980s to the formally separate system of "workplace co-determination"
through works councils. Largely the same people serve simultaneously on both
7. Of course, that base may also be weak, or the law may only be partly observed.
8. Even the German works council system, while otherwise organized on a strict workers-only
basis, incorporates one institution that does include the employer: the Wirtschaftsausschufi (eco-
nomic committee) to which the employer must reveal confidential information on the economic
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bodies, and works councillors use the information and access they get as board
members to increase their effectiveness as works councillors.
On the basis of our definition, and as a very general classification, we distin-
guish three ideal types of works councils:
Paternalistic councils are formed by employers or governments to forestall
or undo unionization. Often, such councils include or are presided over by the
employer. Councils of this kind are (allowed to be) representative of workers
to the extent that this is necessary to prevent independent expression of
worker interests.
Consultative councils are set up to improve communication between man-
agement and workers through exchange of information and through consulta-
tion, in order to facilitate cooperation in production and thereby enhance the
competitive performance of the enterprise or plant. Unlike paternalistic coun-
cils, the main function of which is "political," consultative councils are put in
place primarily for economic purposes—in the belief that there are a range of
production-related issues on which employers and workforces may cooperate
to mutual benefit. While collective representation of workers is assumed to
facilitate such cooperation, representation in the form of collective bargaining
is seen as unable to raise the relevant issues, or as distorting them by placing
them in an "adversarial" context. As a second channel of industrial relations
supplementing collective bargaining, consultative councils respond to em-
ployer interests in worker "involvement" and to worker interests in the compet-
itiveness of the firm that employs them and, perhaps, in an intrinsically re-
warding utilization of their skills.
Representative councils are typically established through collective
agreement or legislation giving the entire workforce of a plant or enterprise
(again, unionized or not) some form of institutionalized voice in relation to
management. Representative councils enable workers to assert distributional
or general interests that the employer would not be willing to gratify for pater-
nalistic or economic reasons alone. As a second-channel institution existing
alongside unions and collective bargaining, they reflect a belief that workers
have workplace-based interests that fail to be sufficiently represented by
unions and collective bargaining and that require some form of worker "partic-
ipation" in management in order to be realized. In this sense, the rationale for
their establishment is "industrial democracy."
While consultative councils may be seen as supplementing the functional
organization of the firm, representative councils—like, in a different way, pa-
ternalistic councils—are part of a firm's political system. Characteristically,
representative councils have or claim rights, not just to information and consul-
tation, but also to co-determination—or use other ways of intervening in the
exercise of managerial prerogative, in pursuing worker interests.
Of course, ideal types rarely exist in pure form. All works councils have at
least some representational function. And all, except possibly the most radical11 The Study of Works Councils: Concepts and Problems
representative councils, serve some productivist consultative purposes. Indeed,
the main problem in understanding works councils is to disentangle, for differ-
ent historical periods and national contexts, their often densely interwoven pa-
ternalistic, consultative, and representative functions.
1.2 Works Councils and Unions
Union attitudes toward works councils differ widely across countries and
have often changed dramatically over time within them. Indeed, union-council
relations seem to have moved through all conceivable permutations, and then
often in rapid succession—with councils alternatively supported and rejected
by unions for both "left" and "right" strategic reasons.
Historically, works councils have been most prominent in the industrial rela-
tions systems of continental Europe. There, craft unionism, the natural organi-
zational site of which was the workplace itself, was early blocked or absorbed
by politically oriented industrial unionism, the natural organizational site of
which was the national economy and polity as a whole. The success of political
industrial unionism thus bred questions unique to it: How to deal with pres-
sures for the representation of workers employed in a specific plant or firm, as
distinguished from representation of all workers in a sector or country? How
to add an internal to the external union organization? How to link the two?
It should be noted that the rise of political industrial unionism was due in
part to the success of employers in preserving managerial prerogatives inside
the firm—their Herr im Hause status—and not letting unions enter their work-
places. Often assisted by an authoritarian state, employers forced unions to
seek bases and resources of power other than those found directly in the labor
process. This encouraged the politicized model of union action, organized out-
side the workplace, that aimed either—in its moderate version—at sectoral
or national collective bargaining and "political exchange" or—in its radical
version—at the wholesale overthrow of the economic-political system.
In any case, having established itself as such, political unionism did not
typically deploy its newly gained power to reverse the outcome of the battle
over union presence at the workplace that it had lost in its formative period. In
fact, political unionism came to hold deep suspicions about workplace organi-
zation and representation. These were regarded as a potential base for the as-
sertion of the particularistic and economistic interests of workers—at odds
with the objective of mobilizing broad, political, class-based solidarity across
the boundaries of individual plants, enterprises, or, for that matter, occupations.
Therefore, where remnants of craft unionism had survived employers' attacks,
political unionism usually did its best to undo and absorb them in its more
encompassing organizations.
There are two versions of the suspicion in which political industrial union-
ism holds workplace representation. For moderate unions trading wage and
other restraints for political concessions on social welfare, employment, fiscal,12 Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck
and other policies, the workplace is a zone of potential wildcat militancy—
excessive demands, unauthorized strikes, and overshooting settlements ("wage
drift")—especially in prosperous firms. For militant unions engaged in politi-
cal class struggle, the enterprise is a sphere of potential wildcat cooperation
with the employer—workers acting on their narrow interest in the health and
profitability of "their" firm and disregarding the interests of the working class
as a whole.
9
Industrial unions' typical fear of workplace-based particularism opened the
possibility, and often indeed produced the reality, of an unlikely compromise
between employers interested in protecting managerial prerogative and politi-
cal unions keen on establishing a universalistic, class-based interpretation of
worker interests. If on nothing else, employers wanting the freedom to run
"their" workplace as they saw fit and unions seeking to build class solidarity
for dealing with employers politically or abolishing them altogether could
agree on neutralizing the workplace as a site of conflict—on avoiding work-
place negotiations by recognizing each other as interlocutors at the industrial
or national level and on helping each other prevent independent organization
of worker interests at the workplace. It is this "negative convergence" of inter-
ests that has long been in the background of the politics of workplace represen-
tation in continental European industrial relations.
Of course, the problem with a peace formula like this was always that, as
much as the neutralization of the workplace may have corresponded to both
sides' first preference, it was bound to be unstable, making the resulting truce
a permanently uneasy one. For unions, centralized and politicized as they may
be, neutralization of the workplace inevitably means an organization gap,
making it hard for them to recruit members, collect dues, and mobilize support
for industrywide or national collective action. For employers, an unrepresented
workforce may give rise to a consultation gap, precluding potentially produc-
tive representative communication between management and workers. For
workers themselves, centralized unionism and collective bargaining may leave
a representation gap regarding workplace-specific interests that cannot be ade-
quately served at the industrial or national level.
Neutralization of the workplace thus creates an institutional vacuum that
demands to be filled and that poses powerful temptations to invade it: for
unions, to set up externally controlled workplace union sections; for employ-
ers, to organize consultative councils to improve productive performance or
9. Note that while the two problems may seem to be mutually exclusive opposites, the typical
social democratic union faces them both in that it has to mobilize for conflict as well as accept
compromise, making it as vulnerable to insurgent cooperation as to insurgent militancy. Instructive
here is the use of the term "syndicalism" in the language of a union like IG Metall, the industrial
union of German metalworkers. "Syndicalism" denotes any "plant-egoistic," workplace-specific
articulation of interests in conflict with industrial union policy—be it ("militant") demands for
higher wages and better conditions than negotiated at the industrial level or cooperation with the
employer in contradiction of union policy. Conm'ctual or cooperative, syndicalism is the worst
offense an IG Metall workplace leader can commit.13 The Study of Works Councils: Concepts and Problems
paternalistic councils to prevent union penetration or independent workplace
organization; for workers, to form representative councils, cooperate with
employer-controlled councils, or demand union workplace organizations; and
for all of them, to invent and explore ever new strategies, alliances, trade-offs,
compromises, and institutional hybrids to fill the vacuum. It is in this context
that works councils have again and again surfaced in the industrial relations
systems of continental Europe—as a way to fill the void left at the workplace
by the always tenuous compromise between centralized political unionism and
managerial prerogative.
Councils also emerged in the Anglo-American world of early, persistent,
and hegemonic craft unionism. Here they were typically promoted by employ-
ers looking for interlocutors on behalf of their workforces that were more iden-
tified with the enterprise that employed them than with their occupation or
with workers as a class. Unions, as a consequence, came to regard councils as
instruments of employers designed to undermine them, and since they had been
there first, they strongly preferred collective bargaining over any (other) form
of "industrial democracy."
1
0 To the extent that defeating employers' works
council initiatives required organizational effort and personal sacrifice, the ex-
perience of the struggle had a lasting impact on unions' attitudes toward coun-
cils in those countries and defined works councils ideologically in a way that
long ruled out any accommodation with them.
In the politicized industrial relations systems of continental Europe, the mat-
ter was considerably more complicated, and ultimately generative of the broad
variety of dual structures of workplace representation, and complex configura-
tions of external unions, internal unions, and works councils, that one observes
today. Emerging industrial unions often encountered council systems that had
historically preceded them, either shop stewards in the craft union tradition or
paternalistic councils set up by employers as a preventative measure against
unionization.
1
1 Where this was the case, industrial unions had to absorb or
abolish the councils in order to establish themselves as the principal represen-
tatives of worker interests. This happened, for example, in the German metal-
working industry before 1914, where the socialist union had to find ways of
integrating existing workplace representatives (often referred to as Vertrauen-
10. This history is not without ambiguity, however. In discussions in the United States in the
1920s, near the high point of the "American plan" of company unions, some observers sympathetic
to unions (and even some unions themselves) looked more favorably on councils as a way of
assuring at least some measure of representation in nonunionized settings and of providing unions
with a foothold for organizing. A fascinating analysis, showing the openness of the U.S. discus-
sion, is provided by Douglas (1921).
11. Councils had also been an early demand of workers. In Germany, the liberal Paulskirche
Constitution of 1848, which never took effect, provided for legally regulated council representa-
tion of workers at the workplace. The difference from England in this respect is remarkable; in
addition to the obvious differences in trade union strength, it seems to reflect different "cultural"
perceptions of the firm: what in England appeared, and appears, to be a "nexus of contracts" was
in Germany from early on regarded as an institution.14 Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck
sleute) in its growing organization. The price for such integration was accep-
tance of some form of internal union organization, which however became
increasingly closely tied into the external union. Other battles had to be fought
with paternalistic, employer-dominated councils. Councils also emerged in
other countries at the time, with some, for example in Italy, being established
by employers and unions together to provide for orderly internal governance
of large industrial workplaces.
During the First World War, mainstream European unions collaborated with
their national governments in the war effort, achieving lasting gains in legal
and political recognition at the price of growing opposition from their mem-
bers. As external unions appeared to lose control over the shop floor, govern-
ments tried to help them close the widening representation gap by promoting
various kinds of councils designed to give workforces narrowly circumscribed
participation rights. Typically, however, it was the growing radical opposition
to the war and to the meanwhile more or less established official unions that
drew the support of the workers in the factories of the war economy. Especially
after the Russian Revolution of 1917, which by its own Bolshevik description
had been a self-consciously councilist (soviet) revolution, governments and
unions in many European countries found themselves confronted by a revolu-
tionary movement of "workers' councils" which saw itself as the basis of a new
social order: a "producer democracy" based on direct worker self-government
without employers, states, and, not least, trade unions.
In the immediate postwar period, mainstream unions and social democratic
parties often joined forces with the remnants of the old regimes, in particular
the army, to suppress the "syndicalist" councils—only to see the return of pa-
ternalistic councils a few years later or, as in Italy and Germany, to be done
away themselves by their short-time allies, together with the liberal democracy
whose victory over the syndicalist council project they had helped bring about.
A special development took place in Germany and was intensely watched
elsewhere in Europe. Having broken the political backbone of the syndicalist
council movement, the Social Democrats, led by the eminent labor lawyer
Hugo Sinzheimer, institutionalized the defeated "workers' councils" (Arbeiter-
rdte) as "works councils" (Betriebsrdte) in the 1920 Weimar Constitution and
the Betriebsrdtegesetz, thereby laying the cornerstone for what later became
the German Works Constitution (Arbeitsverfassung). Works councils, to be
elected by all workers regardless of union membership, were given legal rights
and responsibilities with respect to both representation of workers at the work-
place and consultation and cooperation with management. In addition, they
were made legally responsible for supervising the implementation of indus-
trywide collective agreements and public legislation applicable to their work-
place. Finally, they were barred from calling strikes, with wage bargaining ex-
plicitly reserved for the unions and employers' associations.
Sinzheimer's Arbeitsverfassung was an early attempt to address the problem
of a potential representation gap at the workplace under centralized industrial15 The Study of Works Councils: Concepts and Problems
relations, and to fill that gap in a way compatible with both industrial unionism
and parliamentary democracy. It also took into account the demonstrated inten-
sity of the demand of German workers for workplace representation—be it
radical, cooperative, or both. The legislation of 1920 was to make it possible
for unions and works councils to coexist with and benefit from each other,
incorporating the councils in unionism in the same way that it incorporated the
unions in the new democratic system—by granting them constitutionalized
rights to self-governance while at the same time firmly establishing the pri-
macy of the more encompassing over the more specific order. While councils
were to be in charge of the workplace-related interests of workers, unions were
to represent their general interests. While councils were to look after the prod-
uctivist cooperative interests of workers as producers, unions were left free to
represent the distributional conflictual interests of workers as consumers and
citizens. Union control over the strike and the industrial agreement assured
the precedence of general over special interests, and of pluralist conflict over
productivist cooperation.
The legislation of 1920 was only the beginning of a long evolution, one
never without tension. By the mid-1920s, many of the onetime "left" councils
again behaved "right" (and often, for that matter, "yellow"). At the same time,
the memory of the more ambitious demands of the postwar council movement
lingered in German unions' project of economic democracy (Wirtschaftsdemo-
kratie). In it, councils, either of workers alone or of workers and employers,
were to be the principal agents of economic decision making. Operating both
at the workplace and at the sectoral and national levels, their powers would
extend to investment decisions and the setting of prices. With economic de-
mocracy aborted by the Nazis, Sinzheimer's design came to fruition only after
1945, when the less demanding "co-determination"—itself conceived as a
"third way" between socialism and full-fledged capitalism—became the Ger-
man unions' main strategic objective. Under co-determination, works councils
gradually turned into the local infrastructure of a flexible system of shared,
quasi-public, centralized governance of the employment contract.
The German case, precisely because it underwent so many twists and turns,
impressively illustrates the ineradicable ambivalence of unions toward works
councils. As is evident not only from this case but from others in continental
Europe, councils may be all kinds of things to unions: employer-sponsored
union substitutes, as well as vehicles of union recognition and union access to
the workplace; radical syndicalist opposition to unionism and collective bar-
gaining, as well as easily controlled internal representatives of the external
union; agents of particularistic collaboration with the employer, as well as of
particularistic militancy; supports for centralized bargaining, as well as ve-
hicles of decentralization. As a result, depending on the circumstances, unions
have preferred or accepted a vast variety of configurations at the workplace:
from total absence of any organization at all, to more or less externally con-
trolled workplace union sections, to works councils based on union rights, col-16 Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck
lective agreement, or special legislation—with or without rights to co-
management.
1.3 Works Councils and Employers
Employers have been just as ambivalent as unions toward councils. Their
overriding concern in workplace industrial relations has always been to protect
their freedom to manage as they see fit. But employers are often also interested
in their workers' cooperating with them, above and beyond the call of contrac-
tual duty, in a common pursuit of productivity, competitiveness, and profitabil-
ity. To the extent that institutionalized consultation with workforce representa-
tives may contribute to such cooperation, employers have eschewed the
consultation gap in an unorganized workplace and have often inclined toward
supporting some kind of council structure.
The problem is that such structure, once in place, may be hard to sterilize
politically. While originally intended to be no more than consultative bodies,
councils may be captured by workers seeking not just consultation on produc-
tion matters, but a chance for articulating distributional interests different from
the employer's. Councils may also be used by external forces, such as unions,
as an entryway into the workplace, where they may insert themselves between
employer and workforce. Institutional structures created to increase acceptance
of managerial decisions may thus ultimately enable workers to contest such
decisions, or to demand participation in them. For employers, the improved
opportunities councils offer for collective communication may thus come at
too high a price.
It is this dilemma—the danger that institutionalized consultation, set up to
increase productivity, may undermine the managerial control that is the tradi-
tional means of increasing productivity—that explains why historically the
attitudes of employers toward councils have been as diverse as those of unions.
At various times and places, employers have promoted councils on their own
and then abolished them when they became too independent—sometimes, as
with syndicalist councils, in alliance with governments and unions. They have
urged governments to introduce councils by legislation where unions threat-
ened to penetrate the workplace. And where unions had already penetrated,
they have tried to turn union workplace organizations into works councils, to
get antiunion candidates elected in works council elections, to get unionized
works councillors to carry the conflict between workplace-specific and general
worker interests into the union itself, to isolate councils from the influence of
external, full-time union officials, to break up unitary structures of workplace
representation by introducing separate councils for white-collar or managerial
employees, and to help external unions gain control over too independent coun-
cils—in ever changing alliances with workplace leaders, external unions, and
governments of different political compositions.17 The Study of Works Councils: Concepts and Problems
Amid this variation and flux, however, there have been definite periods dur-
ing which employers and unions agreed on councils of a certain kind and were
jointly capable of assigning them a place in a common industrial relations sys-
tem. One such period in Western Europe came immediately after World War
II. At that time, employers had lost the capacity to support authoritarian alter-
natives to liberal democracy, just as communist and syndicalist tendencies
among labor movements were more or less effectively suppressed by the Amer-
ican presence. Unlike the interwar period, there was no doubt that industrial
relations in reconstructed Europe would be both labor inclusive and moder-
ate—with employers recognizing unions and unions by and large accepting the
role of employers. The pressing need for economic reconstruction, moreover,
virtually forced unions and employers to work together in pursuit of eco-
nomic improvement.
In this situation, unions and employers in most Western European countries
agreed on supplementing centralized collective bargaining with workplace-
based bodies for joint consultation. These consultative councils were insulated
from distributive conflict and dedicated to improving economic performance;
their power to negotiate local agreements, if recognized at all, was carefully
circumscribed. Again, postwar consultative councils were in some measure a
concession by labor to employers; they reflected union acceptance of the em-
ployer's right to manage, in exchange for employer acceptance of centralized
collective bargaining. But they also responded to union needs for neutralizing
the workplace as a condition for a centralized, universalistic, and egalitarian
union policy.
Postwar consultative councils came in many different forms, depending on
the specific political situation and the institutional traditions of their respective
countries. Some council systems were created by national collective agreement
between unions and employers—raising, and differently answering, the ques-
tion of whether nonunionized workers were allowed to vote in elections or
serve on councils. In other countries, councils were legally based, and some
were equipped with incipient rights to co-determination that served as a re-
minder of continuing union doubts about unlimited managerial prerogative
even in centralized industrial relations systems. These differences, as will be
seen, were important in how council systems evolved later. But the commonali-
ties are also of interest—the consensual recognition in many countries, in a
situation of economic hardship, of a need for joint collective consultation at the
workplace through special institutions that were not involved in the inevitable
distributional conflict between employers and workers and that provided for
productive cooperation within the broader context of that conflict.
Still, the contradictions and dilemmas of councils remained and were soon
to surface again, for employers no less than for unions. For the former, even
consultative councils raised the puzzling problems summarized in Alan Flan-
ders's paradoxical observation that to retain control over the workplace, man-18 Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck
agement might have to share it with the workers.
1
2 To be safe from encroach-
ment on their power to manage, employers preferred councils to remain
voluntary arrangements controlled unilaterally by themselves—neither legis-
lated nor prescribed or regulated by collective bargaining. Legislation was wel-
come only insofar as it imposed legal limitations on councils—especially by
subjecting them to a "peace obligation," requiring them to cooperate with the
employer in good faith, and limiting their relations with unions—while similar
obligations for employers, in particular those that might have detracted from
their right to manage, were fiercely resisted and could be imposed by govern-
ments only in exceptional circumstances.
With the notable exception of the most strongly legally based council sys-
tem—Germany's—consultative councils generally fell into disuse in Western
European countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Of the many reasons for this, one
surely was the general insistence by employers that councils only be consulted
at their discretion, as they saw fit in the unrestricted exercise of their manage-
rial rights. This was bound to result in a "trust gap" among workers who came
to believe, in the absence of enforceable management obligations to consult or
inform, that management turned to councils only if doing so served its own
interests. Unions in particular came to regard councils at best as a management
tool, and at worst as a device to cultivate company patriotism at their expense.
Employers, for their part, expected councils not only to yield economic bene-
fits but also to keep unionization at bay, without however allowing them to
perform meaningful representative functions. As a result, both sides became
disappointed and lost interest, and joint consultation systems gradually dried
up, with industrial relations becoming increasingly identified with conflictual
collective bargaining. For the unions this was just as well until the late 1960s
when a wave of spontaneous worker unrest reminded them, too, of the dangers
of a representation gap at the workplace.
Employer preferences for voluntarism—for works councils limited to re-
ceiving information without obligation for management to wait for their re-
sponse, and certainly for consultation over co-determination: overinstitutiona-
lized, obligatory sharing of management control—were not necessarily
modified by the experience of the attrition of postwar joint council systems.
Nor do they seem to have been diluted by the easily available observation that
even legally based works councils such as the German ones, with a strong
union connection and significant capacity to interfere with managerial decision
making, may be compatible with high economic performance in competitive
markets and may even outright contribute to it. While the limited capacity to
promote confidence in voluntary information and consultation practices moti-
vated exclusively by economic expediency or the employer's unilateral good-
will is one thing—making workers hedge against management defection in
pursuit of short-term economic benefits—the fear of a loss in discretion and
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"flexibility" that is associated with more institutionalized representation is
quite another. The history of works councils in postwar Western Europe dem-
onstrates that, left to their own devices, employers find it exceedingly hard to
resolve this dilemma.
One way in which employers have historically responded to the quandaries
of representative collective representation is by trying to avoid it altogether and
instead to base social relations at the workplace on nonrepresentative, one-to-
one communication with individual employees. This approach, which reaches
back at least as far as the "human relations" school of the 1930s, seems to have
been rediscovered on a broad scale in the 1980s, when it came to be referred
to as "human resource management." Recent interest among employers in rein-
dividualizing the employment relationship seems to reflect both a growing eco-
nomic payoff of improved communication between management and labor at
the workplace and traditional management concerns about the unwelcome side
effects of collective representation. Individualized human resource manage-
ment seems to have progressed most where postwar consultative councils had
faded away in the absence of a supportive legal framework, and where unions
were either too hostile to serve as a conduit for workplace cooperation or too
weak to defeat employer attempts to exclude them from a socially recon-
structed workplace. Although human resource management is itself likely to
be beset with dilemmas and contradictions—and probably with the same ones
as its predecessors—its appearance does seem to pose problems even for
strong unions and well-established works councils, which are hard pressed to
find ways of establishing a role for themselves in the new methods of person-
nel management.
Human resource management may be seen as an attempt by employers to
take the social organization of the workplace in their own hands. The strategy
seeks simultaneously to avoid the political risks of a disorganized and thus
potentially radical workforce, the economic costs of deficient communication,
and the expense of relying on a potentially adversarial representative interme-
diary. There may, however, be economic, social, and political conditions under
which management unilateralism, even in this most sophisticated of forms,
fails to accomplish its objectives. Today, with the larger questions of capital-
ism, socialism, and democracy more or less settled, there are indications in
many European countries of a possible renaissance of councils as a workplace-
based infrastructure of productive cooperation alongside institutionalized con-
flict. According to some of the country studies in this volume, competitive
market pressures for cooperation and consensus at the point of production may
have become so strong that employers, for lack of a better alternative, may
now be willing to accept representative institutional arrangements of labor-
management cooperation, even if they involve a unionized works council mak-
ing the joint pursuit of mutual economic advantage conditional on shared con-
trol over managerial decisions.
To the extent that this is indeed the case, there may today be a broad if silent20 Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck
movement in the industrial relations of advanced capitalist countries toward a
new productivist covenant between capital and labor. Again, this appears in a
rich variety of empirical manifestations—not always easily discernible, and
inevitably beset with ambiguities, paradoxes, dilemmas, contradictions, and
tensions that make it inherently precarious and dependent on constant renewal
and reinforcement.
1.4 Works Councils and the State
In many European countries, liberal democracy was introduced only against
the violent resistance of radical syndicalist council movements. The worker
councils of World War I saw themselves as the foundation of a decentralized,
direct-democratic producer democracy that had no need for a "state"—that is,
for territorially based political rule with parties, parliaments, and bureaucracies
alienated from the organization of material production.
Nowhere, of course, did syndicalist projects come close to realization. They
were opposed not only by the old and new ruling classes but also by main-
stream unions and social democratic parties, as well as communists.
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firmly established after 1945, however, European liberal democracies could
afford to treat works councils as one element among others of a new social
order of production, and as part of a preferably self-governing system of indus-
trial relations within which organized workers and employers were given broad
freedom to regulate their affairs on their own.
With workers and unions strong enough to insist on free collective bar-
gaining as an essential element of the "postwar settlement" between capital
and labor, governments and legal systems tried to stay out of industrial rela-
tions, as much as possible devolving to those immediately concerned the gov-
ernance of a subject as politically explosive as the employment contract. The
extent to which industrial relations came to be founded on "voluntarism" dif-
fered between countries, in line with national traditions and specific political
circumstances, although the tendency for governments to minimize their direct
involvement was universal. But it also differed for types of institutions—with
workplace representation, and particularly works councils, more likely every-
where to be legally regulated or constituted than, for example, union organiza-
tion or collective bargaining.
State intervention in workplace representation may amount to as much as
full-scale legislative introduction of a second channel of industrial relations,
as in Germany, or to as little as the minimalist prescriptions found in Italian or
Swedish law. In all countries, however, workplace representation has a ten-
dency to be less voluntaristically based than other industrial relations institu-
tions. This is most likely the case because it touches on so many fundamental
13. Exemplary here was the policy of the Communists in the USSR itself, who immediately
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issues—from the exercise of property rights to the rights of workers to free
association—that finding an acceptable solution for them may be too difficult
for unions and employers acting on their own without support of formal law,
and too important to the public order to be treated as a private affair.
For example, governments may be drawn into regulating workplace repre-
sentation because of its effects on nonunionized workers, making it even less
amenable than centralized wage bargaining to being construed as a bilateral
matter between unions and employers. Also, employers may seek legal protec-
tion against worker or union interference with their right to manage, while
unions may call for legislation against employers refusing to allow them onto
their premises or, as in Sweden in the early 1970s, to agree to union-based
"industrial democracy." And governments themselves may regard it as in the
public interest to deploy legislation to help employers, workers, and unions,
not only to insulate the workplace from distributive conflict but to institutional-
ize it as a site for productive cooperation.
In keeping with their general inclination to avoid direct entanglement in
industrial relations, governments often prefer to wait for unions and employers'
associations to regulate workplace representation by industrial agreement, or
they pass no more than framework legislation to be filled out by supplementary
collective bargaining at the enterprise or more typically national level. But
even where unions and employers are able to agree on a structure of workplace
representation, they may ask governments to pass their understanding into for-
mal law—to make it binding on all workplaces in a country or sector regard-
less of membership in unions or employers' associations, or to strengthen the
positive effects of representation on cooperation by providing them with legal
backing. And governments may threaten to legislate if the "social parties" do
not strike an acceptable agreement between themselves. In this way, govern-
ments may not just expedite but may even direct the negotiation of these par-
ties, producing a result that is de facto far less "voluntaristic" than it looks.
If the terms of workplace-based representation are more likely to find legal
expression, moreover, they are not often revised. Legislatures tend to stay away
from the existing law, regardless of changes in political majorities or economic
and organizational conditions. And rather than trying to accommodate new
problems with new legislation, governments prefer to let the parties at the
workplace make adjustments in practice, or to wait for legal innovation to
come from the courts. This is so even in such countries as Germany, where the
use of law in industrial relations is widely accepted. There, the Works Constitu-
tion Act of 1951 was revised once, in 1972, and has since remained basically
unchanged—in spite of the change of government in the early 1980s to the
Christian Democrats and regardless of the country's unification in 1990.
The extraordinary stability of the law on workplace representation reflects
the technical complexities of the subject and the political sensitivity of re-
opening the political bargain underlying it, as well as the need of the parties to
industrial relations for steadiness and predictability of the institutional condi-22 Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck
tions in which they interact. Together these factors seem to make works council
legislation similar to constitutional law even where it is not, as in Germany,
referred to as such.
Among the subjects of, direct and indirect, legal intervention in workplace
representation, and in works council systems in particular, are:
1. Creation of councils: Typically works councils are not mandatory. Even
the German Works Constitution Act requires a minimal initiative from workers
or unions for a council to be set up, probably as a measure of perceived need
and spontaneous support. Legal thresholds for council formation are, however,
very low. Unions tend to be given special procedural privileges, and employers
have no right to object, nor can they demand that an established council be re-
scinded.
2. Election procedures: Most countries regulate in law the voting proce-
dure, the nomination of union and nonunion candidates, and the lengths of
terms of council office, although in Italy all of these are left to the unions to
determine unilaterally, and in Sweden most of them are. Unions are usually
given certain privileges in nominating candidates, even where the procedure is
not strictly union based, and large, "representative" unions with many votes
tend to be advantaged in the allocation of council seats—reflecting a shared
interest among unions, employers, and government in limiting the influence of
"splinter groups."
3. Council resources: Universally, employers must defray the costs of coun-
cils. Typically, the number of paid hours council members can spend on their
position is regulated in legislation, as are other rights of councils and their
members—for example, to office facilities, training, and special employment
protection. Legislation on these matters exists even in countries, like Italy, with
otherwise highly voluntaristic council systems, presumably because a suffi-
cient resource base is so essential for councils that it cannot be left to the dis-
cretion of employers. Nowhere do councils have to collect dues from workers,
as unlike unions councils are not voluntary associations. Council resources are
legally kept apart from union resources, although unions are everywhere more
or less marginally, and more or less legally, subsidized by councils—and, less
frequently, council activities may be subsidized by unions. In most countries,
finally, unions, councils, or both may negotiate additional resources for coun-
cils above and beyond what the law prescribes.
4. Relations between councils and unions: Where councils are not legally
defined as union bodies, the law typically sets unions and councils apart while
at the same time establishing relations between them. Legislation on the latter
is usually highly contested, involving such touchy issues as the right of coun-
cils to use union assistance (if necessary, against employer objections) and the
right of unions, especially full-time union officials, to have access to councils
(even over either council or employer objections). Other subjects of legal regu-
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or obligations of councils to consult with external unions before making major
decisions, the participation of full-time union officials in council negotiations
with the employer, the performance of union functions by council members,
and again, the access of unions to council resources. In some systems, unions
may have a legal right to initiate recall procedures against councils neglecting
their duties, including the duty to cooperate in good faith with industrial unions
and carry out the industrial agreement.
5. Council rights and obligations: National systems differ perhaps most
widely in the extent to which rights and obligations of works councils are de-
tailed in formal law—compare, for example, the German Works Constitution
Act to the Italian Statuto dei Lavoratori. The matter is politically highly sensi-
tive as it pertains to both the functional differentiation between unions and
councils and the extent to which councils may infringe on managerial preroga-
tive and, ultimately, property rights. Functional differentiation as well as co-
determination require law, either legislation or, less likely, binding industrial
agreements, and the more there is to be of them, the more law there will tend
to be. To the extent that council rights are legally different from union rights
and councils are formally independent of unions as organizations, rights are
likely to be accompanied by obligations—for example, rights to information
accompanied by obligations to preserve confidentiality, and rights to consulta-
tion and co-determination accompanied by obligations to observe industrial
peace and to cooperate with the employer in good faith. Balancing the rights
and obligations of councils is an exceedingly difficult task for legislation to
accomplish, and therefore not easily taken on. Employers that violate council
rights are typically subject to legal sanction, but so may be councils that fail to
perform their obligations.
Some types of works councils, such as health and safety councils, may be
set up by law directly and prescriptively in the context of regulatory legislation
when governments need reliable instruments to enforce rules regulating em-
ployer behavior at the workplace. Tied to enabling legislation with particular
goals, councils emerging in this context are functionally specialized and nar-
rowly circumscribed in their jurisdiction. They may, however, accumulate
tasks, or later be merged with similar bodies, or be chartered for other legisla-
tion, to realize administrative economies.
6. Dispute resolution: Where the law refuses councils recourse to the strike,
it may compensate them with alternative means of power to exercise their
rights and counterbalance the employer's powers of decision making. Typically,
councils have legal standing to seek redress in courts if their rights are in-
fringed on. Where councils have rights to co-determination and may use them
to veto employer decisions, the law must in addition provide for efficient mech-
anisms to break a possible impasse—for example, arbitration committees with
the power to make binding awards.
Both management and labor have at different times and in different circum-
stances called on government to regulate workplace representation to suit their24 Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck
special interests. Often legislative intervention was not much more than the
imposition of one side's political will on the other, or at best the formalization
of a compromise between the two that merely reflected a momentary balance
of power. But a more creative role for public policy also seems possible, one
that uses the state's unique capacity for authoritative institutional design to
increase the certainty, and thereby expand the range, of mutually beneficial
cooperation at the workplace. The way governments have done this is by intro-
ducing into the relations between the immediate participants externally en-
forceable obligations that make the continuation of cooperative behavior less
sensitive to short-term fluctuations in goodwill or self-interest. Deployed in
this way, formal law becomes a productive resource in its own right. By in-
jecting a nonvoluntary, public dimension into arrangements otherwise prone to
instabilities arising from defection, it stabilizes cooperative practices against
defensive expectations of such defection. It is this potential contribution of
legal-political intervention to long-term cooperation that would seem to be the
most intriguing aspect of the role of the state in workplace representation
today.
1.5 Method of Research and Organization of the Volume
This book surveys the recent experience with works councils in Europe and
North America, with special attention to possible lessons from Europe for the
discussion in the United States on alternative or supplementary forms of work-
place representation. The present chapter has introduced the book's main con-
cepts, explored the politics and institutional characteristics of works councils
in relation to unions, employers, and governments, and outlined the history of
works councils in Europe. The next chapter, which completes the introductory
part of this volume, attempts to model the basic economics of works councils.
It shows why councils may be expected to contribute to good economic perfor-
mance.
Apart from the United Kingdom and Ireland, works councils are an estab-
lished feature of the industrial relations systems of most Western European
countries, and have increasingly become so in recent years. Part II of this book
is therefore devoted to Europe, in particular to the economically advanced de-
mocracies of Western Europe, using them as a research site in an attempt to
find general insights into the nature of works councils. There are six country
chapters, each reviewing the history and present state of councils in a particular
Western European country (chaps. 3 to 8), a chapter on supranational works
councils in the European Community (chap. 9), and one on councils in Poland,
an Eastern European country in transition to a market economy (chap. 10).
The sequence of country chapters begins with Germany (chap. 3) and the Neth-
erlands (chap. 4), two countries where works councils operate on a strong legal
base. This is followed by a consideration of France (chap. 5) and Spain (chap.
6), two countries that have weaker, though also legally based, councils func-25 The Study of Works Councils: Concepts and Problems
tioning in an environment of declining politicized multiunionism. Chapters 7
and 8 deal with Sweden and Italy, where councils are not prescribed in law
but have developed out of cooperative relations between employers and strong
unions. Part II concludes with a synopsis and synthesis of the European coun-
try studies (chap. 11).
The Western European country chapters loosely follow a common format.
They all focus on the postwar period, and especially on developments in the
past two decades of increased competition and intense economic restructuring.
Each chapter describes the structure of its country's works council system, its
organizational and legal base, the rights and obligations vested in it, its rela-
tions with unions, employers, and governments, and especially its impact on
and response to economic change.
Understanding the subtleties of the institutional politics of work councils
requires extensive description of institutional structures and political condi-
tions, of the surrounding industrial relations systems, and of councils' histori-
cal development. Due to the low number of cases and limited cross-national
comparability, most of the information used for comparison must be qualita-
tive, including that bearing on councils' economic effects. Rather than
applying rigorous statistical analysis, which is impossible and always will be,
the discussion relies on the identification of parallel developments and com-
mon trends and is more concerned with understanding the range of possible
variations and options than with developing deterministic causal propositions.
Part III deals with North America. Chapter 12 looks at joint health and safety
councils in Canada, as an example of a council-like structure in a North Ameri-
can country. Chapter 13 recounts the story of futile attempts in the United
States to institute union-independent workforce representation, places the
United States in comparative perspective, and explores the implications of the
Western European experience for current policy debates about labor law
reform.
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